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SECOND CIRCUIT HOLDS STATE STANDARD
DETERMINES AMENABILITY OF FOREIGN
CORPORATION TO SERVICE OF
PROCESS IN DIVERSITY
ACTION
Arrowsmith v. United Press International
320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963)
Plaintiff, a Maryland resident, filed a complaint against United Press
International, a New York corporation, in the federal district court for
Vermont. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was doing business in Vermont
and that diversity of citizenship existed. The theory of the action was
libel, based upon a claim that UPI had dispatched a news item, under an
Atlanta, Georgia dateline, which contained a defamatory reference to plain-
tiff as a "fat cat financier" of anti-Semitic terrorist activity. Although
plaintiff alleged that the report had been transmitted to UPI's Vermont
subscribers, he did not allege that he suffered damage to his reputation in
Vermont, or that a Vermont publication had caused injury to his reputa-
tion in another state. The suit seems to have been brought in Vermont
in order to take advantage of that state's liberal statute of limitations for
defamation.' Defendant's Vermont activities were very restricted. UPI's
only Vermont employee was a woman who maintained a desk at the State
House in Montpelier. This "manager" of the Montpelier "news bureau"
sent direct reports to Vermont and New Hampshire subscribers of UPI,
as well as to UPI's Boston office. UPI transmitted news materials into
Vermont from out-of-state offices. Service was made upon the "manager"
at Montpelier. Defendant moved to dismiss upon grounds of lack of juris-
diction of defendant's person, improper venue, and that the complaint did
not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court dis-
missed the complaint for failure to state a claim, without considering the
validity of the service or venue.2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting en
banc, reversed, holding that the trial court had erred in considering the
sufficiency of the complaint before deciding whether the service was valid.
The court decided that the trial court should use state law to determine
whether defendant corporation was amenable to service in Vermont, over-
ruling Jaftex Corporation v. Randolph Mills, Inc.3 The case was remanded
to the trial court.4
1 Vt. Stat. Ann, tit. 12, §512(3) (1958), discussion at note 2 of the majority
opinion, Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, infra note 4 at 221.
2 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 205 F. Supp. 56 (D. Vt. 1962).
3 282 F2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
4 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
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In Jaftex, the same court had decided, as an alternative ground for its
holding, that federal law determined whether a foreign corporation was
amenable to service in the district, in a diversity action. The lone dissenter
in the instant case, Judge Clark, wrote the majority opinion in Jaftex. The
majority in Jaftex concluded that the policy of providing litigants a trial
according to federal standards required adoption of a federal standard for
the purpose of determining whether a corporation was "present" in the
district for purposes of service. Supreme Court decisions requiring federal
courts to enforce state "door-closing" statutes in diversity cases5 were con-
sidered to be inapplicable for the reason that no clear state policy would be
violated by the use of a federal test in the case before the court. The Jaftex
court also concluded that the question of whether a foreign corporation was
sufficiently active in a district to make it amenable to service within the
district had always been decided by federal standards.
The majority in the instant case felt that Jaftex was against the clear
weight of authority and was leading to unfortunate results in the district
courts.6 Judge Friendly, writing for the majority, felt that state policy, as
enunciated in the relevant state statutes, should not be disregarded, in the
absence of a federal statute or rule to the contrary. The court found an
"overwhelming consensus" to the effect that the law of the state where the
court sits determines whether a foreign corporation is subject to a federal
court's process under the diversity jurisdiction. The majority concluded
that no federal policy required displacement of state rules in this area,
finding no federal rule or statute which required the application of a federal
standard.
The dissent found support in recent Supreme Court decisions for the
proposition that federal courts must afford litigants a trial according to
federal standards.7 The dissent argued that there has always been a clear
federal policy of protecting persons from litigation in forums which are
distant from their residence. In an appendix to the dissenting opinion, most
of the precedents cited in the majority opinion were distinguished on the
ground that they had been decided under a different subdivision of Rule
4(d). Rule 4(d) (3), involved in the instant case, simply sets forth the
5 Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947) ; Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337
U.S. 535 (1949), holding federal law determines which issues are to be submitted to
the jury in diversity actions.
6 Note 5 of the majority opinion describes the decision in Southern New England
Distrib. Corp. v. Berkeley Finance Corp., 30 F.R.D. 43 (D. Conn. 1962), in which the
district court reluctantly applied the rule stated in Jaftex, to find that the court had
jurisdiction in spite of a clear Connecticut state policy which precluded assertion of
jurisdiction by a Connecticut state court. But the decision represents an improper
application of Jaftex since the case had been removed from state court. State law
determines the validity of service in a removed action, Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear,
Inc., 165 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948).
7 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) ; Simler V. Conner,
372 U.S. 221 (1963).
s Fed. R. Civ. P. 4. Process
(d) Summons: Personal Service.
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persons who may be served in order to subject corporations to the juris-
diction of a federal court. Rule 4(d) (7) provides that the mehods of
service provided by state law may be used as an alternative to the method
prescribed in 4(d) (3). The dissent argues that, although state law must
obviously be followed under subdivision (7), it need not be under (3).
The dissent would follow state law under subdivision (7), but would apply
a federal standard under (3). But the majority has the better of this issue,
pointing out that cases arising under both subsections involve two issues:
(1) whether the proper manner of service was used; and (2) whether the
defendant was liable to service at that location. Although decisions as to
the manner of service under subsection (7) would not be controlling under
subsection (3), it is difficult to see why the second question should not be
the same under both subsections. In the majority's view of the precedents,
there is authority for their position in every other circuit, except the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
The duty of according federal litigants a trial by federal standards is
of doubtful relevance to the question whether Arrowsmith should be given
a federal forum in Vermont. The dissent views the instant case as being
inconsistent with the use of the proposed uniform rules of evidence for the
federal courts, in cases arising under the diversity of jurisdiction. But
surely these questions can be decided on their own merits. The question
whether a corporation should be subjected to the inconvenience of a trial in
a state in which it does not have a substantial amount of business activity is
a question which presents policy decisions which are very different from the
policies involved in regulating the manner of trial in federal diversity
actions.
The federal standard proposed by the dissent could be used to prevent
various methods of state discrimination against foreign corporations which
are litigants in federal courts within the state, but in view of the precedents
. . . Service shall be made as follows:
(3) Upon a domestic or foreign corporation or upon a partnership or
other unincorporated association which is subject to suit under a
common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the com-
plaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or to any other
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive
service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a copy to the
defendant.
(7) Upon a defendant of any class referred to in paragraph (1) or (3)
of this subdivision of this rule, it is also sufficient if the summons and
complaint are served in the manner prescribed by any statute of the
United States or in the manner prescribed by the law of the state in
which the district court is held for the service of summons or other
like process upon any such defendant in an action brought in the
courts of general jurisdiction of that state. (Formerly provided for
service in the manner prescribed by the state in which service is
made.)
1964]
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and practical considerations, this policy cannot be effectively pursued. As
a practical matter, it would be extremely difficult for a state to protect
resident defendants against out-of-state plaintiffs, since the plaintiff could
always serve the local defendant within the state. If the state discriminates
against foreign corporations, as defendants, by using "long-arm" service
statutes to subject such corporations to the state's jurisdiction where no
reasonable basis for such jurisdiction exists, constitutional limitations will
provide an effective check upon such abuse.9 If the use of a long-arm statute
in a particular case does not contravene constitutional limitations the federal
courts cannot effectively prevent service by the use of a federal standard,
under Rule 4(d) (3), because the plaintiff has the option of making service
pursuant to 4(d) (7). Since the dissent concedes that state law controls
the validity of service under 4(d) (7), it would be a simple matter to avoid
a more restrictive federal standard under 4(d) (3) by service under the
other subdivision.
A state rule which does not exercise the full jurisdiction available to
the state constitutional limitations may well be the expression of valid state
policy decisions. 10 Since the states appear to have the predominant interest
in determining whether foreign corporations should be subject to service
within their borders, a state rule should be used to determine the validity
of service in federal diversity actions. The result in the instant case is not
only in accordance with the weight of authority, but is also correct from
the viewpoint of respecting state policy.
9 See generally, Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); McGee v.
Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
10 The state law involved in the instant case arguably enunciates no clear state
policy, but see Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l., supra note 4 at 226:
State statutes determining what foreign corporations may be sued . . .like most
legislation ... represent a balancing of various considerations-for example,
affording a forum for wrongs connected with the state and conveniencing resident
plaintiffs while avoiding the discouragement of activity within the state by foreign
corporations.
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